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Business acquisition, resource redeployment, and asset divestiture are elements of a dynamic
process in which ﬁrms change their businesses by recombining internal and external resources.
Analyzing 253 horizontal acquisitions, we show that post-acquisition resource redeployment
leads to asset divestiture from the business that receives the redeployed resources, but not from
the business that contributes the new resources. Consistent with scale economies rationales,
we ﬁnd that strategic similarity also leads to greater asset divestiture from the target ﬁrms.
Many theoretical perspectives are skeptical about the positive rationale for acquisitions and
many of these believe that asset divestiture is evidence of acquisition failure. Our arguments and
analysis help reﬁne the accepted wisdom. In particular, the pattern of resource redeployment
and asset divestiture in our analysis suggests that acquisitions provide a means of reconﬁguring
the structure of resources within ﬁrms and that asset divestiture is a logical consequence of this
reconﬁguration process. Copyright  2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This study examines the causes of asset divesti-
ture following horizontal acquisitions. Asset di-
vestiture is the partial or complete sale or disposal
of physical and organizational assets, shut down of
facilities, and reduction of work forces of target or
acquirer businesses. Post-acquisition asset divesti-
ture has long represented a substantial fraction of
M&A activity (Gilmour, 1973). In the 1980s and
early 1990s, about 35 to 45 percent of reported
M&As were divestitures of previously-acquired
units by other ﬁrms (Weston, 1994). Similarly,
Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)
report a high incidence of post-acquisition divesti-
ture. Scholars often argue that the high rate of
post-acquisition divestiture is evidence of acqui-
sition failure, but this conclusion has two key lim-
its. First, prior research emphasizes divestiture of
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target business assets, with little attention to post-
acquisition divestiture of the assets of acquiring
businesses. Second, and perhaps most critically,
the research under-emphasizes the positive side of
post-acquisition divestiture as part of the dynamic
process of business change.
Our research tests a more positive view of
asset divestiture following horizontal acquisitions.
The study departs from previous research in two
ways. First, we develop the idea that divestiture
is often part of the reconﬁguration of the merg-
ing ﬁrms. Second, we examine divestiture of both
acquirer and target assets. In this approach, we
emphasize partial divestiture of target and acquir-
ing business assets following horizontal acqui-
sitions, as ﬁrms retain and integrate some ele-
ments of target businesses within their existing
businesses. Our arguments contrast with the neg-
ative perspectives on horizontal acquisitions and
post-acquisition divestitures that have dominated
the traditional anti-trust literature as well as some
managerial critiques.
Copyright  2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 9 July 1999
Final revision received 2 December 2000818 L. Capron, W. Mitchell and A. Swaminathan
This work extends recent research that pro-
vides a richer understanding of the positive role
that asset divestiture plays in acquisition strategy.
Many of the scholars who take a positive view
of post-acquisition asset divestiture have argued
that divestiture occurs when companies have slack
resources that increased scale would absorb, such
that some resources in the other company become
redundant. This argument is rooted in the tradi-
tional scale efﬁciency perspective on acquisitions.
In this view, divestiture is part of a consolida-
tion process that helps ﬁrms gain scale efﬁcien-
cies by selling off excess capacity (e.g., Jensen
and Ruback, 1983; Dutz, 1989; Hoskisson, John-
son, and Moesel, 1994; Anand and Singh, 1997;
Bergh, 1997). We seek to build on the scale efﬁ-
ciency argument, by taking a more dynamic view
of acquisitions and stressing that asset divestiture
also reﬂects evolving reconﬁguration of capabili-
ties of ﬁrms.
In our view, asset divestiture is a logical conse-
quence of a process in which ﬁrms often use acqui-
sitions to reconﬁgure the structure of resources
within ﬁrms. This business dynamics argument
takes its root in the resource-based view of the
ﬁrm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), evolution-
ary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and
theories of intra-organizational change (Kogut and
Zander, 1992; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). The
core argument is that acquisitions help targets and
acquirers reconﬁgure their businesses in the face
of the strong inertial forces that constrain their
actions (Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998).
We view acquisitions as strategic actions that help
ﬁrms attempt to modify their resources, as well
as the routines that underlie resources (Winter,
1987; Mitchell, 2000), so that their skills keep
pace with changes in their environments. Mod-
ifying resources and routines involves both the
redeployment of resources to and from target and
acquirer ﬁrms, along with the divestiture of obso-
lete resources. Resource redeployment is the use
by a target or acquirer business of the other
businesses’ resources, where redeployment may
involve physical transfer of resources to new loca-
tions or sharing resources such as R&D facilities
and distribution systems without physical trans-
fer (Capron et al., 1998). Resources are stocks
of knowledge, ﬁnancial assets, physical assets,
human capital, and other tangible and intangible
factors that a business owns or controls (Werner-
felt, 1984).
We develop hypotheses concerning the direct
and indirect causes of asset divestiture. The tra-
ditional efﬁciency argument predicts that asset
divestiture is likely to increase with strategic simi-
larity between acquirer and target. The reconﬁgura-
tion view argues that divestiture of unneeded assets
is a key part of the post-acquisition reconﬁguration
process, such that asset divestiture often occurs as
the result of resource redeployment between target
and acquirer ﬁrms. We argue that resource rede-
ployment to one business will lead to divestiture
of assets from that business, that is, we expect
resource redeployment to lead to divestiture from
the business that receives the resources. We also
expect that resource redeployment to and from tar-
gets will increase with strategic similarity between
acquirer and target, because acquirer and target
ﬁrms that share similar strategic features have
greater opportunities for sharing relevant resources
and greater absorptive capacity for each other’s
resources. The study addresses several alternative
negative and positive critiques of post-acquisition
asset divestiture.
We test our predictions with a sample of 253
horizontal acquisitions by ﬁrms based in Europe
and North America between 1988 and 1992. The
data set has a broad distribution of acquirer and
target ﬁrms across industries and countries, and
contains unusually detailed information concern-
ing post-acquisition resource redeployment and
asset divestiture between target and acquirer ﬁrms.
(Previous research has used this data to exam-
ine different questions concerning post-acquisition
strategy.1) The results in this study support most
predictions. The results support the reconﬁguration
perspective, because we ﬁnd that asset divestiture
from a target or acquiring business increases as
resource redeployment to the business increases.
We also ﬁnd some support for the scale efﬁciency
perspective, as the divestiture of targets’ assets
increases with the extent of strategic similarity
between acquirers and targets.
In the discussion section of the paper, we
outline how this approach to studying business
acquisition, resource redeployment, and asset
1 Prior studies using this data focus on resource redeployment,
rather then asset divestiture. Capron et al. (1998) study the
impact of individual dimensions of resource asymmetry on
resource redeployment. Capron and Mitchell (1998) study the
incidence of bilateral resource redeployment. Capron (1999)
studies the effect of resource redeployment on acquisition
performance.
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divestiture describes elements of a dynamic
process of business development, in which ﬁrms
change by recombining internal and external
resources. This recombination helps ﬁrms create
novel business resources by drawing from both
within and outside existing organizations.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical model, which
this section describes. The main paths in the model
run (1) from strategic similarity to asset divestiture
(H1a and H1b), (2) from strategic similarity to
resource deployment (H2a and H2b), and, in turn,
(3) from resource redeployment to asset divestiture
(H3a and H3b). The ﬁrst proposition relates to
the scale efﬁciency perspective, in which asset
divestiture from over-lapping businesses involves
the disposal of redundant resources. The second
and third propositions relate to the reconﬁguration
view, in which asset divestiture is an outcome
of resource redeployment to and from targets.
These two perspectives are complementary. In
the scale efﬁciency perspective, asset divestiture
is a primary post-acquisition outcome, without
the mediating resource redeployment process.
In the reconﬁguration perspective, resource
redeployment mediates the relationship between
strategic similarity and asset divestiture.
Before proceeding, we will brieﬂy discuss the
concept of asset divestiture, which is our ultimate
dependent variable. As we noted, post-acquisition
asset divestiture includes disposing of physical
and organizational assets, shutting down facilities,
and reducing work forces of target or acquirer
businesses. Divestiture most often involves par-
tial business sale or shut down, but ﬁrms some-
times divest entire target or acquirer businesses.
Partial divestitures often begin soon after acqui-
sition, while most complete divestitures take sev-
eral years (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Our
predictions apply to both partial and complete
divestitures, and our empirical analysis will com-
bine both types of cases (Unfortunately, our data
do not include enough complete divestitures to
distinguish meaningfully between partial and com-
plete divestitures).
Asset divestiture: the scale efﬁciency view
From the scale efﬁciency perspective, post-acquisi-
tion asset divestiture is likely if one company
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Figure 1. Post-acquisition resource redeployment and divestiture model
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has slack resources that increased scale would
absorb, such that some assets in the other com-
pany become redundant. For instance, Dutz (1989),
Hoskisson et al., (1994), and Anand and Singh
(1997) argue that divestiture allows a ﬁrm to
gain scale efﬁciencies by selling off excess capac-
ity in declining industries. Such post-acquisition
opportunities for efﬁciencies will also arise in sta-
ble or growing industries (Seth, 1990b). Asset
divestiture arising from redundancies is especially
likely following horizontal acquisitions with over-
lapping businesses (O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan,
1998). Mergers between ﬁrms that exhibit similar
strategic characteristics, such as direct competition,
common customers, and common geographic mar-
kets, result in higher opportunities for scale efﬁ-
ciencies than acquisitions involving strategically
dissimilar ﬁrms (Ramaswamy, 1997). When target
and acquirer ﬁrms share similar strategic charac-
teristics, their current strategies are more likely
to overlap and they are more likely to be able
to exploit their shared experience, leading them
to divest redundant assets. Figure 1 reports the
parameter terms in each hypothesis.
Proposition 1: The greater the strategic sim-
ilarity of target and acquirer businesses, the
greater the asset divestiture following an
acquisition.
Hypothesis 1a (γ31 > 0): The greater the strate-
gic similarity of target and acquirer businesses,
the greater the divestiture of the target’s re-
sources following an acquisition.
Hypothesis 1b (γ41 > 0): The greater the
strategic similarity of target and acquirer
businesses, the greater the divestiture of
the acquirer’s resources following an
acquisition.
Strategic similarity is a multi-dimensional con-
cept. To foreshadow our empirical analysis, we
will measure strategic similarity on three dimen-
sions, including customers, geographic markets,
and competition.
In scale efﬁciency cases, asset divestiture
is a primary post-acquisition outcome, without
the mediating resource redeployment process.
We now turn to reconﬁguration and stress
the resource redeployment process that mediates
the relationship between strategic similarity and
asset divestiture, which prior research under-
emphasizes.
Asset divestiture: the reconﬁguration view
In the reconﬁguration view, ﬁrm-level innova-
tion rests on the ability to realize new combi-
nations of ﬁrm resources (Galunic and Rodan,
1998). In this argument, acquisitions help targets
and acquirers reconﬁgure their businesses in the
face of the strong inertial forces that constrain
their actions. Acquisitions are strategic actions that
often allow ﬁrms to modify their competencies
so that their skills keep pace with changes in
its environment (Bowman and Singh, 1990, 1993;
Kogut and Zander, 1996; Oliver, 1997). After
acquisitions, ﬁrms can undertake the process of
recombining existing resources with resources that
they obtained via acquisitions. Karim and Mitchell
(2000), for instance, show that acquirers com-
monly use resources from targets to change their
resource proﬁles. As we shall see, modifying com-
petencies involves both redeployment of resources
across target and acquirer ﬁrms and divestiture of
obsolete resources.
We start by discussing the inﬂuence of strategic
similarity on post-acquisition resource redeploy-
ment (we address other inﬂuences when we discuss
control variables). Resource redeployment after
acquisition reﬂects the need for a ﬁrm to reshuf-
ﬂe its newly combined portfolio of resources.
The reshufﬂing may involve changes that range
from allowing the ﬁrm to augment existing activ-
ities to undertaking substantial transformation of
routines and resources (Capron, 1999). Whether
changes emphasize augmentation or transforma-
tion, resource redeployment will tend to increase
with strategic similarity, because the similarity
provides greater potential for absorbing resources
across ﬁrms.
We note that post-acquisition redeployment pri-
marily for gaining scale economies, with few
changes other than adding resources identical to
those that a ﬁrm already possesses, will be rela-
tively uncommon. In most cases, ﬁrms can achieve
simple scale changes more cheaply and directly
by purchasing discrete resources, rather than by
acquiring other businesses. Instead, post-acqui-
sition redeployment that provides increased scale
also tends to lead to changes in the ways that
the ﬁrms produce and sell the goods that result
from the larger operations. Thus, what we some-
times think of as scale efﬁciency objectives contain
major elements of business reconﬁguration.
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Resource redeployment tends to be strong when
the merging ﬁrms can share similar resources that
are relevant within each other’s context. Firms
with similar skills tend to be better positioned
to exploit redeployment beneﬁts, when compared
to ﬁrms with divergent strategies (Prahalad and
Bettis, 1986). From an economic standpoint, a
valuable resource is more likely to create value
when redeployed in a similar competitive con-
text, because key success factors are similar and
thereby provide more value-creating opportunities,
whether from greater economies of scale or from
business transformation. From a process stand-
point, ﬁrms are more capable of change and able
to redeploy resources to and from targets when
the target and the acquirer ﬁrms share a similar
strategic context. The absorptive capacity argu-
ment suggests that the ability to use the resources
of the other merging ﬁrm increases when the tar-
geted resources are related to the ﬁrm’s existing
resources (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Strategic similarity facilitates the integration of
target and acquirer resources from both technical
and organizational perspectives (Ahuja and Katila,
1998; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Singh and
Zollo, 1997). Although strategically similar ﬁrms
may have heterogeneous capabilities, such hetero-
geneity will tend to be less than among ﬁrms that
operate in dissimilar contexts. Isomorphic inﬂu-
ences of strategic similarity will lead many ﬁrms to
adopt common practices and develop capabilities
that derive from related technical and organiza-
tional bases. Even if some speciﬁc resources dif-
fer substantially among ﬁrms operating in similar
contexts, similarities among other activities within
the businesses tend to provide a contextual under-
standing that facilitates redeployment and use of
heterogenous resources.
Strategic similarity creates a shared understand-
ing that facilitates post-acquisition resource rede-
ployment between the target and the acquirer,
while dissimilarity reduces the parties’ contextual
knowledge and interferes with redeployment. The
shared understanding arises from common knowl-
edge and industry experiences (Huff, 1982), com-
mon repertoires of strategies (Spender, 1987), and
common collective cognitive models and beliefs
(Porac et al., 1995). Conversely, when the merg-
ing ﬁrms operate in a very different strategic con-
texts, in different environmental settings, they must
manage the process of decontextualization and
recontextualization of the transferred resources,
consisting of realigning those transferring and
those using resources (Weick and Roberts, 1993;
Doz and Santos, 1997; Brannen, Liker and Fruin,
1999). The presence of context-speciﬁc routines
also reduce the probability that ﬁrms will rec-
ognize that resources might be useful in another
context (Galunic and Rodan, 1998). Overall, then,
the greater the similarity of the strategic contexts
in which a resource will be used, the more that
acquirers will redeploy the resource to and from
targets.2
Proposition 2: The greater the strategic similar-
ity of target and acquirer businesses, the greater
the resource redeployment following an acquisi-
tion.
Hypothesis 2a (γ11 > 0): The greater the strate-
gic similarity of target and acquirer businesses,
the greater the resource redeployment to the tar-
get following an acquisition.
Hypothesis 2b (γ21 > 0): The greater the strate-
gic similarity of target and acquirer businesses,
the greater the resource redeployment to the
acquirer following an acquisition.
We now turn to the impact of redeployment
on asset divestiture. The arguments suggest that
acquisitions generate excess resources in the pro-
cess of redeploying resources across the merg-
ing ﬁrms. Firms then sell or shut down excess
physical and organizational resources, and lay off
redundant employees. Such reductions sometimes
occur because a reconﬁgured business has become
smaller but, as Burgelman (1993) notes, also fre-
quently occur when a business changes the mix
and nature of its resources thereby eliminating the
2 The inﬂuence of strategic similarity will be particularly pro-
nounced in cases such as our empirical context of horizontal
acquisitions, that is, of businesses that operate in similar indus-
tries. In such cases, the resources of the target and acquiring
businesses typically will share at least some degree of related-
ness, for which greater strategic similarity will provide greater
redeployment smoothness. However, we would expect the strate-
gic similarity prediction to apply even in cases of non-horizontal
acquisitions. For instance, if an electronics company purchased
a media company, the ability of the electronics producer to rede-
ploy resources to and from the media company would tend to
vary with the similarity or difference of their environments. If
the two companies operated in similar competitive contexts, say,
in the same geographic and customer markets, then the acquirer
would tend to have greater understanding of how to distribute
people and marketing resources between the businesses than if
two businesses sold goods to different types of customers in
different countries.
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need for some once-valuable physical assets and
employees.
We expect divestiture of a business’s assets
to increase with the extent of resource redeploy-
ment to that business. The process of combining
resources to develop new uses will tend to create
redundancies and conﬂicts with existing resources.
The ﬁrm will then tend to divest excess phys-
ical assets, shut surplus facilities, and lay off
surplus employees. This logic suggests that divesti-
ture will occur from the business that receives the
redeployed resources, whether the recipient is the
acquirer or the acquisition target.
Proposition 3: The greater the post-acquisition
redeployment of resources to a business, the
greater the divestiture of assets from that busi-
ness.
Hypothesis 3a (β11 > 0): The greater the post-
acquisition redeployment of resources to a tar-
get, the greater the divestiture of the target’s
assets.
Hypothesis 3b (β22 > 0): The greater the post-
acquisition redeployment of resources to an
acquirer, the greater the divestiture of the ac-
quirer’s assets.
The prediction that resource redeployment leads
to divestiture by the recipient business contrasts
with views in which divestiture occurs at the busi-
ness that provides the resources. We will refer to
this alternative argument as the resource appropria-
tion view. The resource appropriation view empha-
sizes divestiture of a target’s assets, suggesting that
acquirers will divest remaining target assets after
capturing valuable target resources (Duhaime and
Grant, 1984; Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland 1990).
We will test the extent to which the divestiture
of the target’s assets increases with the redeploy-
ment of the target’s resources to the acquirer (β21
in Figure 1) We also control for the reverse case,
in which redeployment to targets might lead to
acquirer asset divestiture (β12).
In summary, our approach addresses both incen-
tives to redeploy resources and the inﬂuence of
strategic similarity and resource redeployment on
divestiture. The predictions argue that ﬁrms often
use acquisitions to reconﬁgure resources within
their businesses and that asset divestiture is a
logical consequence of this reconﬁguration pro-
cess. The arguments apply most directly to cases
in which market failure in resource exchange is
the initial motivation for acquisitions. In addi-
tion, the predictions also apply to cases in which
redeployment is a second-stage decision following
acquisitions that occur for other motives, such as
consolidation and scale efﬁciency. Thus, we argue
that resource redeployment is a common primary
or secondary outcome of acquisitions and, in turn,
that the redeployment inﬂuences post-acquisition
divestiture of assets from the target and acquirer
businesses.
Other potential inﬂuences on resource
redeployment and asset divestiture
The empirical analysis will consider several other
inﬂuences on resource redeployment and asset
divestiture. The potential inﬂuences arise from
resource-based, ﬁrm-level, and industry-level
sources. We outline these inﬂuences at this point
because they arise commonly in other conceptual
perspectives on divestiture.
We ﬁrst control for the resource-based logic
underlying resource redeployment. We earlier
argued that strategic similarity facilitates resource
redeployment. However, sheer similarity without
complementarity of the resources of the merging
ﬁrms may contribute little to subsequent acquisi-
tion performance. Previous research suggests that
resource redeployment increases with the extent of
resource asymmetry between target and acquirer
(Shelton, 1988; Capron et al., 1998; Seth, 1990a).
We expect that merging ﬁrms with greater resource
asymmetry are more likely to redeploy resources
than ﬁrms with lower asymmetry (ξ2 > 0, in
Figure 1).
We then control for ﬁrm and industry-level inﬂu-
ences on asset divestiture. We deﬁned four ﬁrm-
level variables, including pre-acquisition target
proﬁtability, pre-acquisition acquirer proﬁtability,
target sales relative to acquirer, and cross-border
acquisitions. We deﬁned three industry-level vari-
ables, including post-acquisition industry demand
growth, post-acquisition industry price increases,
and post-acquisition industry over-capacity.
The focal independent variables and the control
variables address several traditional positive and
negative explanations for post-acquisition asset
divestiture. Positive critiques of post-acquisition
asset divestiture include gaining efﬁciency by
eliminating redundant assets, consolidating declin-
ing industries, breaking up failing targets, and
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responding to acquirer weakness. If asset divesti-
ture stems from efﬁciency objectives, then divesti-
ture will increase with target size because larger
targets provide greater opportunities for synergies
and scale economies, as well as with strategic sim-
ilarity (Proposition 1). If asset divestiture is part
of industry consolidation, then target and acquirer
asset divestiture will tend to occur when industry-
level demand is declining, prices are falling, and
when industry over-capacity is high, because there
will tend to be greater redundancies among the
merging businesses. If divestiture breaks up fail-
ing targets, then target divestiture will tend to
occur when targets are unproﬁtable. If divestiture
is a response to acquirer weakness, then acquirer
divestiture will tend to occur when acquirers are
unproﬁtable. We view these traditional positive
explanations for asset divestiture as complements
to the reconﬁguration argument.
Negative critiques include resource appropria-
tion and acquisition failure. If divestiture repre-
sents resource appropriation, then target divestiture
might occur when targets are proﬁtable, targets
are small relative to acquirers, acquisitions involve
foreign targets, or acquirers redeploy resources
from targets. If target or acquirer asset divestiture
is a sign of failed acquisitions, divestiture will have
little or no systematic relationship with resource
redeployment. We view these negative explana-
tions for asset divestiture as alternatives to the
positive critiques.
DATA AND METHODS
Survey data
We gathered the data for this study through a sur-
vey in 1994 of North American and European
horizontal acquisitions that took place between
1988 and 1992. The acquisitions involved man-
ufacturing companies operating within the same
industry (deﬁned at the level of about the four
digit U.S. Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation). The
survey approach is appropriate because publicly
available ﬁnancial information does not provide
the level of detail that we need for our research
interests, which requires ﬁne-grained information
concerning post-acquisition activity. The survey
process proceeded in four phases: 1) developing
the measurement scales; 2) developing the survey
instrument; 3) pre-testing the survey and
4) collecting data (Capron, 1999).
The data set includes 253 unique targets and
190 unique acquirers, with the smaller number of
acquirers occurring because some ﬁrms acquired
more than one target and returned a separate
response for each case.3 Table 1 contains descrip-
tive information about the cases we used in the
analysis. Part A of Table 1 indicates that about
40 percent of the acquisitions took place in the
chemical, food, and pharmaceutical industries.
Part B shows that the targets tended to be smaller
than the acquirers. Part C shows that target and
acquirer ﬁrms were more likely to be related due
to overlap in products, technologies, and customers
than due to geographic market overlap or direct
competition. Part D shows that there is substantial
geographic distribution of the ﬁrms. Part E shows
that cross-border acquisitions represent 69 percent
of the cases. Part F shows that 60 percent of the
acquirers were listed as public companies. Part G
shows that most acquirer ﬁrms focused on one
main business or were diversiﬁed in related busi-
nesses before the acquisition. Overall, the data
have a broad distribution of acquirer and target
ﬁrms.
Structural modeling
We chose a structural modeling approach to esti-
mate inﬂuences on post-acquisition redeployment
and divestiture (see, e.g., Larsson and Finkelstein,
1999). We conducted the data analysis with AMOS
3.6 (Arbuckle, 1997), a software package that
estimates structural models with latent variables
based on the structure of the covariance matrix.
AMOS belongs to the second generation of the
multivariate analysis family of techniques, which
also includes LISREL, EQS, and PLS.4 These
causal modeling procedures address structural and
measurement issues in survey research (Fornell,
Lorange and Roos, 1990). Several factors make
causal modeling procedures appropriate to test
our hypothesized model (Bollen, 1989; J¨ oreskog
3 To check for possible ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, we introduced a
dummy variable for such cases into the structural model, ﬁnding
little ﬁrm-speciﬁc inﬂuence and no substantive changes to other
effects.
4 Structural modeling techniques such as AMOS, Lisrel, and
EQS are functionally similar and provide materially-equivalent
results. The advantage of AMOS is that it provides an efﬁcient
estimator in the presence of missing data without needing to
replace or to eliminate the missing cases (Arbuckle, 1997).
Missing cases on items and variables ranged from 5 percent
to 18 percent in our data.
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Table 1. Sample description (253 cases)
A. Industry % D. Home country Acquirer % Target %
Chemicals 15% France 42% 20%
Foods and spirits 15% United Kingdom 16% 17%
Pharmaceuticals 12% United States 14% 16%
Machine tools 6% Germany 10% 11%
Automotive components 6% Scandinavia 8% 5%
Electronics 5% Other European countries 8% 25%
Instruments and medical devices 4% Canada 2% 2%
Plastic packaging 4% Other countries or unknown 1% 4%
Materials 4% Total sample 100% 100%
Appliances 4%
Telecommunications 3% E. Acquisition geographic scope %
Steel 3% Cross-border 69%
Aeronautics 2% Domestic 30%
Paper 2% NA 1%
Miscellaneous 14% Total sample 100%
NA 4%
Total sample 100%
B. Relative size of target to F. Acquirer capital structure %
acquirer (annual sales) % Stock-listed 60%
<25% 52% Non listed 40%
25–49% 22% Total sample 100%
50–74% 7%
75–100% 6%
>100% 8% G. Acquirer diversiﬁcation %
NA 5% Conglomerate 8%
Total sample 100% Diversiﬁed into related business 44%
Focused on one main business 42%
NA 6%
Total sample 100%
C. Nature of relatedness % Highly related
Similar products 63%
Similar technologies 54%
Similar customers 51%
Similar geographic markets 29%
Direct competitors 29%
and S¨ orbom, 1989). The methods consider multi-
ple path coefﬁcients simultaneously to permit the
analysis of direct, indirect, and spurious relation-
ships among variables. The approach suits models
with latent variables and accounts for correla-
tion among them, while testing for convergent
and discriminant validity. The technique estimates
the individual weightings of each observed vari-
able in the context of the theoretical model rather
than in isolation. The model accommodates mea-
surement errors and inter-construct residual error,
as well as reciprocal causation, simultaneity, and
interdependence.
The conceptual variables in Figure 1, which
we introduced at the beginning of the theory
section, are latent variables of the structural model.
The latent theoretical variables include strategic
similarity, resource redeployment to targets and
acquirers, and divestiture of target and acquirer
assets. In addition to the predicted relationships,
we will use the model to estimate other rela-
tionships among the conceptual variables and the
inﬂuences of several control variables. Among the
control variables, resource asymmetry between tar-
get and acquiring business is a latent variable. We
will enter the resource asymmetry control variable
as an inﬂuence on resource redeployment. We enter
the ﬁrm-level and industry-level controls as inﬂu-
ences on asset divestiture.
A structural model for AMOS estimation
consists of two primary parts, a structural model
and a measurement model. An inner structural
model estimates the predicted relationships
between the endogenous and exogenous latent
Copyright  2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 22: 817–844 (2001)Asset Divestiture Following Horizontal Acquisitions 825
conceptual variables. An outer measurement model
estimates the empirical manifestation of latent
conceptual variables in terms of observable
indicators.
The inner structural model of relationships
among latent variables takes the form:
η = βη+  ξ + ζ
where η is a (m × 1) vector of latent endogenous
variables, ξ is a (n × 1) vector of latent exoge-
nous variables, β is a (m × m) matrix of endoge-
nous variable coefﬁcients,   is a (m × n)m a t r i xo f
exogenous variable coefﬁcients, and ζ is a (m × 1)
vector of residuals. The latent endogenous theo-
retical variables in this model are post-acquisition
resource redeployment (to targets and to acquirers)
and post-acquisition asset divestiture (from targets
and from acquirers). The latent exogenous theoret-
ical variables are the causes of resource redeploy-
ment, which in this case is the strategic similarity
between the acquirer and the target. We specify ψ,
the variance-covariance matrix of structural errors,
so as to allow for correlation among the two forms
of resource redeployment (ψ12) and among the two
forms of asset divestiture (ψ34).
In turn, the outer measurement model of items
that contribute to the latent variables takes the
form:
y =  y η + ε and x =  xξ + δ
w h e r eyi sa( p × 1) vector of endogenous indica-
tors, x is a (q × 1) vector of exogenous indicators,
 y is a (p × m) matrix of regression coefﬁcients
of η on y,  x is a (q × n)m a t r i xo fr e g r e s s i o n
coefﬁcients of ξ on x, ε is a (p × 1) vector of mea-
surement error for the indicators of endogenous
variables, and δ is a (q × 1) vector of measurement
error for the indicators of exogenous variables.
In order to provide a metric, we speciﬁed
one measurement indicator of each latent vari-
able as having a factor loading of λ equal to one.
We estimated the AMOS causal model using the
Full Information Maximum Likelihood procedure,
which is an efﬁcient estimator in the presence of
missing data (Arbuckle, 1997).
Variables
We used perceptual measures for the study, owing
to the difﬁculty of using objective measures of
post-acquisition activities (Porter, 1987). Subjec-
tive measures are appropriate when objective mea-
sures do not exist (Dess and Robinson, 1984),
while managerial judgment provides the oppor-
tunity to gather information concerning multiple
dimensions of resource redeployment and divesti-
ture. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the
variables that we use in the study.
We deﬁned several items as indicators in order
to estimate the latent variables in the structural
model. The Appendix reports the survey ques-
tions that we used to form the variables for this
study. Table 3 lists the items and reports their
estimated contributions to the latent variables in
the measurement model. In the next section of
the paper, we discuss reliability, internal consis-
tency, and discriminant validity of the measure-
ment model items and constructs that Table 3
reports.
We used three items, from ﬁve-point scales, to
measure strategic similarity, including whether the
businesses sold to similar customers, operated in
similar geographic markets, and competed directly
with each other. Customer segments, geographic
markets, and competition arise commonly in the
strategy literature as measures of strategic similar-
ity (e.g., Porac et al., 1995). We also combined
four items for the resource asymmetry variable,
including product innovativeness, manufacturing
know-how, commercial dynamism, and product
quality.
We used two sets of items to measure the
resource redeployment variables, redeployment to
targets and redeployment to acquirers. We focus
on four dimensions of resources, including product
innovation, manufacturing know-how, marketing
expertise, and brand redeployment (Barney, 1986;
Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece, Pisano, and
Shuen, 1997). We used a ﬁve-point scale to mea-
sure the magnitude of resource redeployment along
each dimension. We then combined the responses
along the four resource dimensions to create the
resource redeployment variables.
Four items provided measures for the asset
divestiture variables. We based the items on Datta’s
(1991) categorization and scale of resources that
ﬁrms tend to divest following acquisitions, using
seven-category response scales for percentage re-
ductions of each type of resource. The four items
recorded percentage reduction of facilities and
workforce for manufacturing, distribution, sales
Copyright  2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 22: 817–844 (2001)826 L. Capron, W. Mitchell and A. Swaminathan
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Table 3. Results of measurement model
Average
No. of Internal variance
items consistency extracted Correlations between latent variables
1
Latent variables (ξ1)( ξ2)( η1)( η2)( η3)( η4)
(ξ1) Strategic similarity 3 0.80 0.59 0.77
(ξ2) Resource asymmetry of target 4 0.70 0.65 0.07 0.81
to acquirer
(η1) Resource redeployment to 4 0.94 0.80 0.30 −0.43 0.89
target
(η2) Resource redeployment to
acquirer
4 0.96 0.87 0.50 0.53 0.31 0.93
(η3) Target asset divestiture 4 0.92 0.74 0.36 −0.25 0.45 0.18 0.86
(η4) Acquirer asset divestiture 4 0.90 0.71 0.40 0.29 0.10 0.50 0.21 0.84
Unstandardized Critical Ratio
Measurement paths Parameters Estimates
2 (Estimate/SE)
(ξ1) Strategic similarity
→ Similar customers λX11 0.63 6.49
→ Similar geographic markets λX21 0.60 6.03
→ Direct competitors λX31 1.00 Fixed
(ξ2) Resource asymmetry of acquirer to target
→ Asymmetry in innovation λX42 1.00 Fixed
→ Asymmetry in manufacturing know-how λX53 0.78 9.06
→ Asymmetry in commercial dynamism λX64 0.71 7.75
→ Asymmetry in product quality λX75 0.70 8.88
(η1) Resource redeployment to target
→ Product innovation redeployment to target λy11 1.00 Fixed
→ Manufacturing know-how redeployment to target λy21 0.85 9.48
→ Marketing expertise redeployment to target λy31 0.98 9.94
→ Brand redeployment to target λy41 0.72 6.31
(η2) Resource redeployment to acquirer
→ Product innovation redeployment to acquirer λy52 1.00 Fixed
→ Manufacturing know-how redeployment to acquirer λy62 0.94 9.71
→ Marketing expertise redeployment to acquirer λy72 0.87 9.11
→ Brand redeployment to acquirer λy82 0.91 7.84
(η3) Target asset divestiture
→ Manufacturing asset divestiture λy93 0.83 10.66
→ Logistics asset divestiture λy103 0.87 10.75
→ Sales network asset divestiture λy113 0.71 8.80
→ Administration asset divestiture λy123 1.00 Fixed
(η4) Acquirer asset divestiture
→ Manufacturing asset divestiture λy134 0.70 7.77
→ Logistics asset divestiture λy144 1.00 Fixed
→ Sales network asset divestiture λy154 0.71 10.08
→ Administration asset divestiture λy164 0.91 11.70
1 The on-diagonal elements are the square root of the average variance extracted.
2 All coefﬁcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (critical ratio > 2.32).
networks, and administrative services for the tar-
gets and acquirers respectively. Each item repre-
sents the mean values on each dimension for the
acquirer or target of the questions pertaining to the
degree of physical asset divestiture and workforce
reduction.
RESULTS
This section reports descriptive and analytical
results. We ﬁrst comment on the extent and direc-
tion of post-acquisition resource redeployment and
asset divestiture. We then estimate the theoretical
model that Figure 1 depicted.
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Descriptive results
Resource redeployment to and from target
Table 4 reports the extent of redeployment
within the four resource categories. Table 4a re-
ports the extent to which the acquirer redeploys
its resources to the target. As expected, ﬁrms
frequently redeployed innovation, manufacturing,
brand name and marketing resources from acquir-
ers to targets. Resource redeployment of “to some
extent” or greater occurred for 58% to 80% of the
cases among the four resource categories. Table 4b
shows that redeployment to acquirers was some-
what less extensive (47% to 54%). The sum-
mary point is that post-acquisition resource
redeployment is common, particularly to
targets.
Divestiture of targets’ and acquirers’ assets
Table 5 reports the extent of asset divestiture
within four functions, including manufacturing,
logistics, sales networks, and administrative ser-
vices. We deﬁned two reporting thresholds, cor-
responding, ﬁrst, to more than 10% of the assets
or staff affected by the divestiture and, second, to
more than 30% of the assets or staff. The results
show that the magnitude of the post-acquisition
divestiture varied substantially across functions,
particularly at target businesses. At targets, post-
acquisition asset divestiture was somewhat stronger
among manufacturing and administrative functions
than for logistics and sales networks. It may well
be that duplications and excesses tend to arise
most commonly among production and adminis-
tration, while customer-oriented functions tend to
involve less duplication and/or greater market pres-
ence. Moreover, it is clear that post-acquisition
divestiture affects the acquiring and target ﬁrms
in an asymmetric manner: the target is com-
monly two to ﬁve times more strongly affected
than the acquirer. These results are consistent
with the literature that shows that ﬁrms impose
greater divestiture on targets than on acquirers.
Nonetheless, post-acquisition divestiture of many
types of assets from the acquirers was
common.
Table 3 shows that the correlation between over-
all divestiture of target’s assets and divestiture of
acquirer’s assets is low (0.21). The low correla-
tion is consistent with the argument that target and
acquirer asset divestitures are largely independent
outcomes during the post-acquisition reconﬁgura-
tion process.
Table 4. Extent of postacquisition resource redeployment
a: Resource redeployment from acquirer to target
Frequencies
“To some extent
1 2 3 4 5 or greater”
Resource redeployment Not at all To some extent To a very large extent (3 Y 4 Y 5) Mean s.d.
Innovation 12% 16% 28% 26% 18% 72% 3.2 1.3
Manufacturing 11% 10% 29% 29% 22% 80% 3.4 1.2
Marketing expertise 14% 12% 26% 26% 22% 74% 3.3 1.3
Brand names 31% 12% 19% 18% 21% 58% 2.9 1.5
b: Resource redeployment from target to acquirer
Frequencies
“To some extent
1 2 3 4 5 or greater”
Resource redeployment Not at all To some extent To a very large extent (3 Y 4 Y 5) Mean s.d.
Innovation 34% 13% 29% 15% 9% 54% 2.5 1.3
Manufacturing 32% 20% 24% 16% 8% 48% 2.5 1.3
Marketing expertise 32% 22% 27% 11% 9% 47% 2.4 1.3
Brand names 41% 11% 15% 14% 19% 48% 2.6 1.6
The number of cases per cell ranges from 235 to 244.
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Table 5. Extent of post-acquisition asset divestiture
A. Target asset divestiture B. Acquirer asset divestiture
>= 10%
∗ >30%
∗∗ Mean
∗∗∗ S.D. >= 10%
∗ >30%
∗∗ Mean
∗∗∗ S.D.
Manufacturing
Asset disposal 34% 17% 2.2 1.7 14% 6% 1.5 1.1
Staff cutback 44% 18% 2.4 1.5 13% 5% 1.6 1.1
Logistics
Asset disposal 24% 16% 1.9 1.8 7% 5% 1.4 1.3
Staff cutback 21% 11% 1.8 1.4 7% 3% 1.4 1.0
Sales networks
Asset disposal 17% 12% 1.8 1.6 9% 4% 1.4 1.0
Staff cutback 25% 13% 2.0 1.5 10% 4% 1.4 0.9
Administrative services
Asset disposal 36% 22% 2.5 2.0 8% 4% 1.4 1.1
Staff cutback 37% 21% 2.4 1.6 12% 3% 1.5 1.0
∗ Percent of cases in which ﬁrms have divested at least 10% of assets/total assets.
∗∗ Percent of cases in which ﬁrms have divested more than 30% of assets/total assets.
∗∗∗ Scale ranges from 1 (0%) to 7 (91–100%) of assets divested/total assets.
Measurement model
The analysis and interpretation of an AMOS
model take place in two stages (Anderson and
Gerbing, 1988): (1) assessment of the reliability
and validity of the measurement model, and
(2) assessment of the causal relationships within
the structural model. This two-stage sequence
of analyzing the estimated model helps ensure
that we have reliable and valid measures of
constructs before attempting to draw conclusions
regarding the statistical relationships among the
constructs.
Table 3 reports the measurement model that we
estimated before examining structural model rela-
tionships. We modeled the six constructs of the
model as six correlated ﬁrst-order factors. We
tested the measurement model by examining indi-
vidual item reliability, internal consistency, and
discriminant validity.
The measurement model provided acceptable
item reliability. All the item loadings for each
construct in the paths of the measurement model
were signiﬁcant (p<0.01). A common criterion
is to accept items with more explanatory power
than error variance (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). In
practice, this implies high conﬁdence for estimates
of item loadings of 0.70 or greater and exploratory
conﬁdence for loadings between 0.60 and 0.70. All
items met the 0.70 criterion, except two items of
the strategic similarity construct that reached the
0.60 hurdle.
Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest an internal
consistency measure.5 Table 3 reports the inter-
nal consistency of each latent variable construct
from this analysis, using Fornell and Larcker’s
measure. We assessed the values following Nun-
nally’s (1978) guidelines, which suggest 0.70 as a
benchmark for internal consistency. All six latent
variable constructs demonstrate adequate internal
consistency.
Table 3 also includes the estimates of aver-
age variance extracted, which is a second test of
internal consistency.6 Average variance extracted
assesses the amount of variance captured by a
latent variable construct relative to measurement
error, and the correlations (φ estimates) among the
latent constructs in the model. Average variance
extracted estimates of 0.50 or higher indicate valid-
ity for a construct’s measure (Fornell and Larcker,
1981). All estimates achieved this criterion.
Finally, we assessed discriminant validity. A
construct discriminates if it shares more variance
with its measures than with other constructs. If
the correlation between two constructs (φ esti-
mate) is less than the square root of the average
5 Internal consistency = ( λyi)2/( λyi)2 +  var(εi). The inter-
nal consistency measure is similar to Cronbach’s alpha except
that the alpha measure assumes that each indicator of a construct
contributes equally (i.e., the loading is equal to unity). Fornell
and Lacker (1981) argue that their measure is superior to Cron-
bach’s alpha because their measure uses item loadings estimated
within the causal model.
6 Average variance extracted =  λ2
yi/ λ2
yi +   var(εi).
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variance extracted of the two constructs, then there
is support for discriminant validity (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981). All possible pairs of constructs
met this criterion. Table 3 also shows the cor-
relation matrix for the latent variable constructs.
The diagonal of this matrix is the square root of
the average variance extracted measure. Our con-
structs demonstrate adequate discriminant validity
because the diagonal elements are greater than the
off-diagonal elements in the corresponding rows
and columns.
Structural model
Table 6 reports the structural model, while
Figure 2 summarizes key inﬂuences. The model
explains a substantial portion of the observed
asset divestiture. The model explains 41% of
the observed variance in target asset divestiture
and 36% of the observed variance in acquirer
asset divestiture. The model also explains 30% of
the variance in resource redeployment to target
and 50% of resource redeployment to acquirer.
We now turn to the results of the hypothesis
tests.
Proposition 1: Impact of strategic similarity on
asset divestiture
The results partially support Proposition 1,
which argues that greater strategic similarity leads
directly to greater divestiture. Hypothesis 1a is
supported, as greater strategic similarity leads to
greater divestiture of the target’s assets. Hypoth-
esis 1b is not supported, however, as there is no
signiﬁcant relationship between strategic similarity
and divestiture of the acquirer’s assets. Thus, the
acquisitions helped the ﬁrms gain efﬁciency bene-
ﬁts by divesting redundant target assets in similar
strategic environments, but did not result in direct
rationalization of acquirer assets.
To test for the signiﬁcance of differences of the
effect of strategic similarity on target and acquirer
asset divestiture, we used a comparison of means
test (Kmenta, 1986: 145) to examine whether
the effects of strategic similarity and resource
redeployment on divestiture of target assets were
stronger than their effects on the divestiture of
acquirer ﬁrm assets. For earlier applications of this
test in organization theory research, see Miner,
Amburgey, and Stearns (1990: 704), Rao and
Neilsen (1992: 464), and Baum and Oliver (1996:
1411).7 We found that the impact of strategic sim-
ilarity was signiﬁcantly stronger on divestiture of
target assets than on divestiture of acquiring ﬁrm
assets.
The stronger inﬂuence of strategic similarity
on target asset divestiture likely reﬂects the man-
agerial dominance of the acquirer. Acquirer ﬁrms
are often in more powerful positions when com-
pared to target ﬁrms (Brush, 1996). Managers from
the acquirer usually occupy a majority of leader-
ship positions in the combined ﬁrm after acquiring
a target (Walsh, 1988; Chatterjee et al., 1992).
Such inequalities in power, coupled with acquirer
managers’ greater understanding of the acquiring
business’s resources, may lead to more extensive
changes being imposed on the target ﬁrm than on
the acquirer ﬁrm (Datta, 1991; Hambrick and Can-
nella, 1992; Shanley and Correa, 1992; Cannella
and Hambrick, 1993; Pablo, 1994). When strate-
gic similarity generates redundant resources, target
ﬁrms are likely to bear the brunt of the cutbacks
that accompany a divestiture process. In addition,
cultural incompatibility between acquirer and tar-
get ﬁrms is likely to exacerbate this one-sided
change process (Sales and Mirvis, 1985; Jemison
and Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
Proposition 2: Impact of strategic similarity on
resource redeployment
Proposition 2 receives strong support. As ex-
pected, Table 6 shows that strategic similarity
leads to greater redeployment to target (Hypothe-
sis 2a) and to acquirer (Hypothesis 2b). The results
suggest that greater resource redeployment occurs
when the target and acquiring businesses share
similar strategic features. Strategic similarity pro-
vides greater potential for exchanging resources
that are relevant to each other’s business and for
absorbing and recombining resources across ﬁrms.
We also assess the effect of target-acquirer
resource asymmetry on redeployment. Table 6
shows that greater resource asymmetry leads to
greater redeployment from the stronger business
7 The test statistic Z that compares the means of two nor-
mally distributed variables with a same unknown variance
σ 2 is given by: Z = (X1 − X2)/(s • (1/n1 + 1/n2) where s =
•[(n1 − 1)s2
1 + (n2 − 1)s2
2]/(n1 + n2 − 2). Z is distributed as a
t statistic with n1 + n2 − 2 degrees of freedom. X1 and X2 are
the parameter estimates to be compared in the two regression
equations, s1 and s2 are the standard errors of the parameter
estimates, and n1 and n2 are the number of cases in the two
regression equations.
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Figure 2. Post-acquisition resource redeployment and divestiture model results (Summary results from Table 6;
∗∗p<. 05,
∗∗∗p<. 01)
and less redeployment to the weaker business
(Capron et al., 1988). Thus, the results concerning
the causes of resource redeployment are consistent
with the argument that ﬁrms often use acquisitions
as means of exchanging valuable resources that are
both relevant and complementary to each other’s
businesses.
Proposition 3: Impact of resource redeployment
on asset divestiture
Proposition 3 receives strong support. Consis-
tent with Hypothesis 3a, Table 6 shows that greater
resource redeployment to targets leads to greater
divestiture of target resources. In parallel, con-
sistent with Hypothesis 3b, the results show that
greater redeployment to acquirers leads to greater
divestiture of acquirer resources. As predicted,
the results show that resource redeployment leads
to asset divestiture at the business that receives
the resources. These results are consistent with
the argument that divestiture often occurs as an
outcome of post-acquisition business change and
reconﬁguration.
We also control for cross-effects that estimate
possible appropriation from the business that
provides the resources. We found insigniﬁcant
cross-effects between the resource redeployment
and divestiture constructs; these results show
that little divestiture occurs at the business that
provides the resources. The insigniﬁcant cross-
effects run counter to some traditional explanations
for post-acquisition divestitures, which emphasize
an appropriation logic in which ﬁrms acquire
particularly valuable resources from a target and
divest the target’s remaining assets. Similarly,
there is little or no effect on divestiture of acquirer
assets when an acquirer transfers its own resources
to a target.
Table 6 also shows that resource redeployment
has greater impact on target asset divestiture than
on acquirer divestiture. This comparison parallels
the earlier result, in which strategic similarity had
more impact on target asset divestiture than on
acquirers. Once again, the stronger inﬂuence on
target asset divestiture likely reﬂects the manage-
rial dominance of the acquirer.
Control variables and sensitivity analyses
Among the control variables, Table 6 shows sev-
eral signiﬁcant ﬁrm-level and industry-level eff-
ects. Firms rarely divested assets of proﬁtable
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targets. Cases involving larger targets led to greater
divestiture of acquirer assets. Domestic acquisi-
tions resulted in greater divestiture of target assets.
Industry price decreases lead to higher target asset
divestiture, presumably in search of greater efﬁ-
ciencies. Industry over-capacity leads to more asset
divestiture by acquirers, likely as consolidation
efforts. Industry over-capacity also leads to less
asset divestiture from targets. The negative impact
of over-capacity on target divestiture may arise
from purchasing targets that have capabilities that
the acquirers hope to use to provide specialized
services in an over-capacity market.
In sensitivity analysis, we considered six pos-
sible inﬂuences. First, we found little impact of
adding a correlation between resource asymmetry
and environmental similarity. Second, the results
did not change when we added variables denoting
the acquirers’ motives for the acquisitions to the
model. Third, we distinguished between divesti-
ture of physical assets and layoffs of employees,
ﬁnding that the redeployment variables had sim-
ilar effects on both physical asset divestiture and
employee layoff, which correlated highly. Fourth,
we found no inﬂuence on either redeployment
or asset divestiture when we added a control
variable that recorded a ﬁrm’s prior acquisitions
within the industry during the ﬁve years before
the focal acquisition, following suggestions that
corporate reorganization may result from path-
dependent internal processes (Jemison and Sitkin,
1986; Davis and Stout, 1992). Fifth, we found
similar results when we allowed the control vari-
ables to inﬂuence resource redeployment as well
as asset divestiture. Sixth, we found no relation-
ships when we added control variables for product
and technical similarity of the acquirer and target
businesses, following suggestions that divestiture
might allow ﬁrms to reduce excessive diversiﬁca-
tion when products and technology differ greatly
(Markides, 1992, 1995) or, conversely, that divesti-
ture might stem from economies of scale if prod-
ucts and technology were similar.
To check the sensitivity of the results to the
statistical method, we also estimated regression
equations corresponding to the paths of the struc-
tural equations (using mean values of the market
similarity, resource asymmetry, resource redeploy-
ment, and asset divestiture items as variables). The
regression results were similar to the structural
equation. Thus, the results are highly robust to
additional variables and speciﬁcations.
In summary, the results of our analysis sup-
port almost all the propositions concerning busi-
ness reconﬁguration. Redeployment both to and
from targets is greater when strategic similarity of
acquirer and target is high. In turn, resource rede-
ployment leads to divestiture at the business that
receives the resources, but not at the contribut-
ing business. In addition, strategic similarity leads
directly to divestiture of target assets (although not
to acquirer asset divestiture). Moreover, redeploy-
ment has greater impact on target asset divestiture
than on acquirer asset divestiture. The results sug-
gest that divestiture arises from the disposal of
redundant target assets in similar strategic envi-
ronments, plus a second stage outcome in which
divestiture of both target and acquirer assets fol-
lows post-acquisition resource redeployment. At
the same time, though, target ﬁrms bear a greater
share of asset divestiture.
DISCUSSION
This study suggests that resource redeployment
and asset divestiture are part of a business recon-
ﬁguration process in which ﬁrms seek to recom-
bine the capabilities of merging businesses. Our
approach contrasts with studies that treat resource
redeployment and asset divestiture as separate
areas of study. The traditional studies often take
a negative view of post-acquisition divestiture or,
at best, regard divestiture as part of consolidation-
driven search for scale efﬁciencies. Our research
provides a more positive and dynamic view of
post-acquisition asset divestiture following hori-
zontal acquisitions.
The results emphasize acquisitions as key parts
of business dynamics, helping ﬁrms to reconﬁg-
ure their resources in the face of constraints to
change. Such reconﬁguration takes the form of
Schumpeterian innovation, in which ﬁrms change
by recombining internal and external resources and
the routines that underlie the resources (Karim and
Mitchell, 2000). This perspective views a ﬁrm as
a collection of routines and resources that are sub-
ject to a variation-selection-retention cycle (Miner,
1993). Acquisitions provide a source of varia-
tion in organizational routines (Nelson and Win-
ter, 1982). Selection processes determine which
resources ﬁrms redeploy to and from targets. Our
analysis emphasizes environmental similarity and
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asymmetric resource endowments as selection fac-
tors. Asset divestiture then follows as an outcome
of resource redeployment, as the ﬁrm retains valu-
able portions of the newly reconﬁgured resources
and divests excess assets. Together, business acqui-
sition, resource redeployment, and asset divestiture
are elements of a process of business adaptation
and reconﬁguration.
This research is part of a recent shift in the
emphasis of studies of organizational change. Es-
tablished evolutionary perspectives in the orga-
nizational, economic, and technology literature
emphasize factors that cause organizations to resist
change or tend to undertake path-dependent
changes owing to routine rigidity within the orga-
nizations (e.g., Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter,
1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Levinthal and
March, 1993). Thus, the traditional emphasis of
evolutionary theories has been on identifying con-
straints to organizational change. However, the
emphasis on routine-based constraints in evolu-
tionary theories leads naturally to examination of
how ﬁrms sometimes change resources and rou-
tines.
Recently, theorists have begun to examine intra-
organizational and inter-organizational processes
that enable change as well as inhibit it (Chang,
1996). Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996), for instance,
examine means by which ﬁrms undertake substan-
tive changes to intra-divisional charters, emphasiz-
ing how the growth of new core businesses affects
the decline of established charters. Galunic and
Rodan (1998) and Singh and Zollo (1997) argue
that ﬁrm-level innovation rests on the ability to
realize novel combinations of ﬁrm resources. Hen-
derson and Cockburn (1994) distinguish between
component competencies that affect day-to-day
problem solving and architectural competencies
that inﬂuence the ability to use and integrate
component competencies. Leonard-Barton (1992)
emphasizes the role of stressful product devel-
opment projects as means of overcoming tradi-
tional rigidities. Helfat and Raubitschek (2000)
focus on the dynamic process of product sequenc-
ing. A substantial stream of research examines the
role of top management turnover in organizational
change (e.g., Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Har-
ris and Helfat, 1997). Several recent studies of
inter-organizational relationships, in turn, empha-
size acquisition of individual (e.g., Chang, 1996;
Liebeskind et al., 1996) and organizational capa-
bilities (e.g., Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Martin,
Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 1998) in facilitating
organizational change. Kogut and Zander (1992)
and Mitchell (1994) argue that acquisitions help
ﬁrms to synthesize and acquire new knowledge.
In parallel, Burgelman (1993) and Seward and
Walsh (1996) argue that corporate divestitures and
spin-offs provide means for ﬁrms to control and
reorganize control resources that no longer ﬁt with
their core skills. While addressing a range of
issues, these approaches to investigation converge
in the sense that they examine resources within
and across organizations as key units of analysis
in studies of organizational change.
These recent resource-focused views share sev-
eral assumptions with traditional evolutionary re-
search. At the core, the perspectives expect sub-
stantial path dependence in the types of changes
that ﬁrms undertake, conditioned on inertia cre-
ated by internal routines and external environ-
ments. Thus, although managers may seek prof-
itable business activities, their ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
external market contexts constrain their actions.
These views assume that much business value
arises from intangible resources that ﬁrms must
adjust over time, but that resources also face
market failure in discrete exchange owing to
valuation and opportunism constraints. At the
same time, though, intra-organizational and inter-
organizational views are beginning to identify
means by which ﬁrms sometimes over-come iner-
tial tendencies, emphasizing the importance of
recombining existing internal resources in order to
use the resources in new ways.
Our approach extends the emphasis on business
dynamics by examining means by which ﬁrms
use acquisitions to recombine internal and external
resources. We argue that business acquisitions can
help ﬁrms acquire and recombine resources from
both within and outside existing organizational
units and, in the process of recombining resources,
undertake substantive change of business units. In
this view, business acquisition and asset divestiture
are often parts of healthy and successful business
processes.
We recognize several limitations of the study.
One limit is that the data draw from a survey of
managers’ perceptions of past events. A second
limit is that our sample acquisitions took place
during a four year period. Further research needs to
carry out longitudinal prospective analysis of more
acquisitions during other periods. Nonetheless, the
research examines a substantial number and variety
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of acquisitions and post-acquisition outcomes, in
greater depth than previous large-sample studies.
The results suggest that resource redeployment
and subsequent asset divestiture are central aspects
of the acquisition process and highlight avenues
for future research. Research needs to discrimi-
nate among kinds of organizational routines and
resources that ﬁrms transfer across targets and
acquirers in the post-acquisition redeployment pro-
cess. We also need to know more about the indi-
vidual, resource, ﬁrm, and industry factors that
shape and impede redeployment and divestiture.
Finally, if asset divestitures are often secondary
outcomes of the acquisition process, as this study
suggests, research should focus on the resource
redeployment process rather than the incidence of
acquisition and divestiture in order to evaluate the
success and failure of acquisition efforts.
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APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
1. POST-ACQUISITION DIVESTITURE MEASURES
The following sections are designed to assess rationalization and restructuring measures that have been
implemented as a result of the merger. Please answer the questions with respect to both the acquired
business and the divisions or business units of your company that operate in the same industry as the
acquired business.
A. Consolidation and Restructuring of Manufacturing
P l e a s eg i v earough assessment of the proportion of the physical manufacturing facilities closed or resold,
the proportion of the production capacity restructured, and the proportion of the manufacturing workforce
cut as a result of the merger.
Acquired business
% of physical
manufacturing facilities
closed or resold (as a
proportion of total
physical manufacturing
facilities)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of manufacturing
workforce cut (as a
proportion of total
manufacturing
workforce)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
Your existing business
% of physical
manufacturing facilities
closed or resold (as a
proportion of total
physical manufacturing
facilities)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of manufacturing
workforce cut (as a
proportion of total
manufacturing
workforce)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
B. Consolidation and Restructuring of Distribution/Logistics Services
P l e a s eg i v earough assessment of the proportion of the physical distribution facilities closed or resold,t h e
proportion of the distribution capacity restructured, and the proportion of the distribution personnel cut as
a result of the merger.
Acquired business
% of physical distribution
facilities closed or resold
(as a proportion of total
physical distribution
facilities)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
(continued overleaf )
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Acquired business (continued)
% of distribution personnel
cut (as a proportion of
total distribution
personnel)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
Your existing business
% of physical distribution
facilities closed or resold
(as a proportion of total
physical distribution
facilities)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of distribution personnel
cut (as a proportion of
total distribution
personnel)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
C. Consolidation and Restructuring of Sales Networks
Please give a rough assessment of the proportion of the sales networks closed or resold,t h e
proportion of the sales affected by the restructuring of sales networks, and the proportion of the sales
personnel cut as a result of the merger.
Acquired business
% of sales networks closed
or resold (as a proportion
of total sales networks)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of sales personnel cut
(as a proportion of total
sales personnel)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
Your existing business
% of sales networks closed
or resold (as a proportion
of total sales networks)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of sales personnel cut
(as a proportion of total
sales personnel)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
D. Consolidation and Restructuring of Administrative Services
Please give a rough assessment of the proportion of the administrative services closed,t h e
proportion of the administrative personnel affected by the restructuring of administrative services,
and the proportion of the administrative personnel cut as a result of the merger.
Acquired business
% of administrative
services closed (as a
proportion of total
administrative services)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of administrative
personnel cut (as a
proportion of total
administrative personnel)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
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Your existing business
% of administrative
services closed (as a
proportion of total
administrative services)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
% of administrative
personnel cut (as a
proportion of total
administrative personnel)
0% 1–10% 11–30% 31–50% 51–70% 71–90% 91–100%
2. POST-ACQUISITION RESOURCE REDEPLOYMENT MEASURES
The following sections ask questions about the transfer of resources, knowledge, and capabilities across
the acquired business and your existing business. Please use the scale below to assess the extent to
which people have been collaborating and resources have been transferred.
A. Transfer of Resources, Knowledge, and Capabilities to Acquirer
To what extent have you used resources from the acquired business to assist your existing business?
NOT AT TOS O M E TOAV E R Y
ALL EXTENT LARGE EXTENT
1. Use of acquired business’s product innovation
capabilities.....
1 234 5
2. Use of acquired business’s know-how in
manufacturing processes.....
1 234 5
3. Use of acquired business’s marketing expertise..... 1 234 5
4. Use of acquired business’s brand names..... 1 234 5
B. Transfer of Resources, Knowledge, and Capabilities to Target
To what extent have you transferred resources from your existing business to assist the acquired
business?
NOT AT TOS O M E TOAV E R Y
ALL EXTENT LARGE EXTENT
1. Transfer of product innovation capabilities to the
acquired business.....
1 234 5
2. Transfer of know-how in manufacturing processes to
the acquired business.....
1 234 5
3. Transfer of marketing expertise to the acquired
business.....
1 234 5
4. Use of your existing business’s brand name by the
acquired business.....
1 234 5
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3. STRATEGIC SIMILARITY OF TARGET AND ACQUIRER
Please compare your existing business with the acquired business just before the acquisition.
NOT AT ALL ABSOLUTELY
1. Your geographical markets were similar 1 2 3 4 5
2. The types of customers to which you sold
were similar
12 3 4 5
3. You were direct competitors 1 2 3 4 5
4. CONTROL VARIABLES
A. Resource-level Effects
Resource asymmetry of target to acquirer.
Please assess the acquired business’s position, compared to your existing business’s position at the
moment of the acquisition.
WEAKER EQUAL STRONGER
1. Innovativeness..... 12 3 4 5
2. Manufacturing know-how..... 12 3 4 5
3. Customer related assets (brands, commercial
networks).....
12 3 4 5
4. Product quality..... 12 3 4 5
B. Firm Effects
1. Proﬁtability (Proﬁt/capital employed) of the acquired business before the acquisition:
1. MUCH LESS PROFITABLE
2. LESS PROFITABLE
3. EQUIVALENT
4. MORE PROFITABLE
5. MUCH MORE PROFITABLE
2. Proﬁtability (Proﬁt/capital employed) of the acquiring business before the acquisition:
1. MUCH LESS PROFITABLE
2. LESS PROFITABLE
3. EQUIVALENT
4. MORE PROFITABLE
5. MUCH MORE PROFITABLE
3. Relative size. Relative proportion of the acquired business’s annual sales in comparison to your
ﬁrm’s sales before the acquisition (in the line of business concerned):
1. <25%
2. 25–49%
3. 50–74%
4. 75–100%
5. >100%
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C. Industry Effects
1. What were the demand trends in the industry after the acquisition?
SHARPLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY SHARPLY
DECLINING DECLINING STABLE INCREASING INCREASING
Trends in
demand in
the
industry
after the
acquisition
1 2 3 4 5
2. What were the price trends in the industry after the acquisition?
SHARPLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY SHARPLY
DECLINING DECLINING STABLE INCREASING INCREASING
Trends in
prices in
the
industry
after the
acquisition
1 2 3 4 5
3. What was the level of production capacity of the industry in comparison to the level of demand
in the relevant market after the acquisition?
SIGNIFICANT SLIGHT PRODUCTION SLIGHT SIGNIFICANT
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION CAPACITY EQUAL PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
UNDERCAPACITY UNDERCAPACITY TO DEMAND OVERCAPACITY OVERCAPACITY
Level of
production
capacity of
the
industry
after the
acquisition
1 2 3 4 5
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